In Search of Pirate\u27s Treasure: The Control and Ownership of Genetic Resource in the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System by Rettig, Daniel
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
1-1-2006
In Search of Pirate's Treasure: The Control and
Ownership of Genetic Resource in the
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System
Daniel Rettig
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Rettig, In Search of Pirate's Treasure: The Control and Ownership of Genetic Resource in the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, 37 U.
Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 261 (2006)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol37/iss2/3
261
In Search of Pirate's Treasure: The Control




I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 261
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ........................ 265
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UN CLOS) ....................................... 265
B. United Nations Convention on Biodiversity
(CB D ) ........................................... 267
C. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) ............. 272
III. PERCEIVED PROBLEMS ................................ 278
A. International Agreement Shortcomings ........... 278
B. B iopiracy ........................................ 280
C. Informed Consent ................................ 282
D. Conflicts between CBD and TRIPS .............. 285
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS ............................... 288
A. Concrete International Standards ................ 288
B. Biopiracy Solutions .............................. 290
C. Informed Consent Protections .................... 292
D. Effective Use of Bioprospecting Agreements ...... 295
V. CONCLUSION ......................................... 296
I. INTRODUCTION
Silver hobbled, grunting, on his crutch . . . and, from
time to time, turned his eyes upon me with a deadly look.
Certainly he took no pains to hide his thoughts; and cer-
tainly I read them like print. In the immediate nearness of
the gold, all else had been forgotten; his promises and the
doctor's warnings were both things of the past; and I could
not doubt that he hoped to seize upon the treasure, find and
board the Hispaniola under cover of night, cut every honest
throat about that island, and sail away as he had at first
intended, laden with crimes and riches ....
* Daniel Rettig received his J.D. from the Florida State University College of
Law in 2005.
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- Treasure Island1
Historically, the islands of the Caribbean and their surround-
ing coral reefs have often been seen as places of mystery and
romance, possessing almost mythical natural beauty; the types of
places where adventurers and explorers would perform daring
deeds in the pursuit of fame and untold riches. Today, the world is
very different from the one where swashbucklers sailed the high
seas and the people of the region with their rich coastal ecosys-
tems have had to learn to live in a global, technology driven world.
However, history has a remarkable tendency to repeat itself, and
once again, on the coral reefs of the Caribbean, amazing unknown
riches await those dedicated and lucky enough to search them out
and those daring or despicable enough to take them.
As a general matter, coral reefs such as those found off the
Caribbean coasts of much of Central America, are unique marine
ecosystems that are found in shallow waters in warm or tropical
parts of the world.2 Coral reefs are also incredibly diverse and pro-
ductive habitats.' While reefs occupy only a small portion of the
ocean, it is estimated that they support millions of species of
plants and animals.4 This treasure trove of biodiversity includes
not only species that are valuable for food and recreation, but also
marine plants and animals that produce compounds with anti-
viral, anti-bacterial and related properties. 5 In fact, coral reef eco-
systems in Jamaica are reported to produce pharmaceutical
materials worth fifty-four to eighty-five million dollars per year.6
The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS) is a complex
of reef ecosystems that stretches from southern Mexico to Hondu-
ras,7 and comprises "the second longest barrier reef in the world."8
The MBRS is unlike most other reef systems, due to its immense
size, complexity and outstanding biological diversity.9 It acts as
an important habitat and breeding ground for a host of marine
1. R.L. STEVENSON, TREASURE ISLAND 271 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1905) (1883).
2. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Taking Steps toward Marine Wilderness
Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 34
McGEORGE L. REV. 155, 183-84 (2003) (discussing general concepts of coral reef
habitat and value).
3. Id. at 184-85.
4. Id. at 184.
5. Id. at 185 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-69, at 2 (1997)).
6. Id.
7. MESOAMERICAN BARRIER REEF SYSTEMS PROJECT, HOME PAGE, http://www.
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creatures, a number of which have significant economic value.1"
The MBRS also provides the livelihood for over a million people in
the region by offering both food and a source of income for the local
population.11
The importance of protecting this extended ecosystem has
spawned the creation of the Project for the Conservation and Sus-
tainable Use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRP), a
cooperative effort between the countries of Mexico, Belize, Guate-
mala and Honduras. 12 The stated overall purpose of the project is
to "enhance protection of the unique and vulnerable marine eco-
systems comprising the MBRS, and to assist the countries of Mex-
ico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras to strengthen and
coordinate regional policies, regulations, and institutional
arrangements for the conservation and sustainable use of this
global public good."1 3 The MBRP was created in June of 2001 in
Belize, and was recognized by the World Bank in November of
that year. 4 The MBRP has several regional objectives that the
participating countries are pursuing, including:
(a) [Sltrengthen[ing] Marine Protected Areas; (b)
develop[ing] and implement[ing] a standardized data man-
agement system of ecosystem monitoring and facilitat[ing]
the dissemination of its outputs throughout the region; (c)
promot[ing] measures which will serve to reduce non-sus-
tainable patterns of economic exploitation of [MBRS] ... ;
(d) increas [ing] local and national capacity for environmen-
tal management through education, information sharing
and training; and (e) facilitat[ing] the strengthening and
coordinating of national policies, regulations, and institu-
tional arrangements for marine ecosystem conservation
and sustainable use.
1 5
At the same time, recent advances in the field of genetics have
ushered in a new age of biotechnology.1 6 These new technologies
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. MESOAMERICAN BARRIER REEF SYSTEMS PROJECT, PROJECT BACKGROUND, http:/
/www.mbrs.org.bz/englishlprojdesc.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
13. MESOAMERICAN BARRIER REEF SYSTEMS PROJECT HoME PAGE, supra note 7.
14. MESOAMERICAN BARRIER REEF SYSTEMS PROJECT, PROJECT BACKGROUND, supra
note 12.
15. Id.
16. See generally Chee Yoke Ling, The Quest for Fair, Equitable and Sustainable
Exchange and Benefit Sharing, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 16,
available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/cop7c.htm (discussing the relationship
between biotechnology interests and the third world within the framework created by
the CBD).
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have led to a host of legal, environmental and political problems
that international players such as the MBRP may have to resolve
if they are to function as intended.17 These include the ownership
of genetic wealth, governing access to that wealth and the technol-
ogies needed to exploit it, and the competing rights of various
groups that have a stake in genetic ownership.'" These problems
have taken shape during a time of increased interest in marine
resources as a source of genetic raw materials needed for the pro-
duction of drugs and other chemicals. 9 Diverse marine ecosystems
such as the MBRS are generally thought to have a very high
probability of producing such raw materials, 2° and based on its
size and outstanding biodiversity, the MBRS is a potential gold
mine of marine genetic resources.2' A major problem for the coun-
tries of the MBRP, in their efforts to conserve and exploit these
resources, is the relative lack of "predictable, fair, and effective
international and domestic legal rules governing ownership of
marine genetic resources."22
Ownership and control of the potential genetic wealth of such
marine ecosystems is affected by several competing concerns. The
first and most obvious is the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).23 Second, but perhaps more direct, are
the effects of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity
(CBD).24 Finally, the effects of the intellectual property regimes
realized under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)25 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
17. See GENERALLY RICHARD McLAUGHLIN, MIssIssiPPI-ALABAMA SEA GRANT LEGAL
PROGRAM, MANAGING ACCESS TO MARINE GENETIC RESOURCES IN BELIZE: COOPERATION
RATHER THAN CAPTURE, http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/mclaughlinab.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing several problem areas in the management of
internationally shared marine resources).
18. See, e.g., Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Kuala Lumpar, Malaysia, Feb. 9-20 and 27, 2004, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision VII/5,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (April 13, 2004) [hereinafter COP]. Conference of
the Parties decisions that span meetings three through seven continually touch on
these matters. Id.




23. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
24. See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
25. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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tual Property Rights (TRIPS)26 are not insubstantial.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)
UNCLOS came into force in November of 1994.27 With over
150 participants, it has become a primary source of international
law concerning a wide array of subjects dealing with the oceans
and navigable waters worldwide.28 As a major source of interna-
tional law, UNCLOS attempts to resolve various issues of national
sovereignty over the oceans and their recourses. 29 Through vari-
ous UNCLOS actions, a framework of rights has evolved that clar-
ifies national positions regarding ownership and control of coastal
and offshore waters and their contents.30 These rights include a
territorial sea31, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)32, and certain
rights to exploit the continental shelf.
3
Territorial sea provisions have the effect of making an area of
ocean stretching from the coast to twelve nautical miles offshore, a
part of the country's sovereign territory.34 The coastal state has
the right to claim exclusive control of this territorial sea and eve-
rything above or below it.35 As a result, anything occurring natu-
rally within such a claim is normally considered a possession of
the coastal state. 6
The EEZ provisions of UNCLOS allow a coastal state to claim
an exclusive economic right to any marine resources that exist in
an area extending 200 nautical miles offshore. 7 This allows
26. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS].
27. UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982
OVERVIEW AND FULL TEXT, http://www.un.orgldepts/los/convention-agreements/
conventionoverviewconvention.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
28. Id.
29. See UNCLOS, supra note 23, Preamble.
30. Id.
31. Id. art. 2.
32. Id. art. 55-75.
33. Id. art. 77.
34. Id. art. 2-16 (defining specific limitations to the territorial sea).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. arts. 56, 57.
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coastal states to exploit marine resources found in the water col-
umn as well as the seabed and subsoil.38
The continental shelf regime is a body of international law
that grants coastal states the power to control, with some limita-
tions, the resources of the continental shelf as far as 350 nautical
miles offshore.39 This regime allows a state to utilize not only sta-
tionary resources of the continental shelf, but also living resources
so long as they cannot effectively move without contacting the sea
floor at specific times during their lifecycle. 40 The combination of
these doctrines places control of shallow water benthic communi-
ties like reefs firmly in the jurisdiction of the coastal states around
which they occur.41 Unfortunately, UNCLOS appears primarily
concerned with economic utilization of tangible marine resources
such as fish stocks or mineral deposits.42 While the Convention
clearly states that marine resources of a coastal state fall within
its zone, up to a distance of at least 200 nautical miles,43 the Con-
vention fails to deal in an adequate fashion with the notion of
genetic resources, which are not always considered a tangible
commodity in that sense. 44 Despite the Convention's lack of clarity
regarding reef genetic resources, it can still be easily inferred that
under the right to claim exclusive economic exploitation of an
area, jurisdiction over such matters will rest with coastal states to
deal with as they see fit, notwithstanding other international
agreements or established international law.45
In light of this, countries of the MBRP have begun to desig-
nate marine protected areas in an effort to deal with the conserva-
tion and management of their marine resources. 46 For instance, at
38. Id. art. 56.
39. Id. arts. 76-84 (providing specific limitations and conditions to a states control
over the continental shelf).
40. Id. art. 77.
41. Id. arts. 2-16, 56, 57, 76-84.
42. Id.
43. See id. arts. 2-16, 33-36, 55-85.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See TOLEDO INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT, PORT HONDURAS
MARINE RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2003, available at http://www.tidebelize.org
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT] (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (follow "News & Events"
hyperlink; then follow "Port Honduras Marine Reserve Annual Report 2003"
hyperlink); see also MESOAMERICAN BARRIER REEF PROJECT, TRAINING MANUAL ON
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR MARINE PROTECTED AREAS,
available at http://www.mbrs.org.bz/dbdocs/tech/MPAplan7.pdf [hereinafter TRAINING
MANUAL] (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) (discussing general feasibility and procedures for
implementing marine reserves in the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System).
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the Hol Chan Marine Reserve in Belize, management goals
include the maintenance of a cross section of coral reef ecosystem
in its natural state. This is being done in an effort to provide both
educational and tourism based opportunities for Belize, as well as
to preserve the value of the area as a source of genetic research.48
Likewise, interests in Honduras have instituted a marine reserve
known as the Port Honduras Marine Reserve (PHMR).49 The
PHMR strategy is comprised of several broad goals:
1. To protect the physical and biological resources of Port
Honduras,
2. To provide education and research,
3. To preserve the value of the area for fisheries and other
important genetic resources,
4. To develop recreational and tourism services that will
enhance the economic and social benefits of the area
without causing environmental damage, and
5. To strive for sustainable financing.50
While these are important goals for the marine reserves of the
MBRP, the lack of specific treatment for genetic resources under
UNCLOS leaves their effectiveness as a tool for the management
of that particular type of resource somewhat in question.
51
B. United Nations Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)
The underlying importance of UNCLOS notwithstanding, the
ability of MBRP countries to exercise control over their genetic
resources is heavily reliant on the CBD, which was introduced on
June 5, 1992 at the "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro. 52 The fol-
lowing summer, the United States signed the Convention despite
initial objections to various economic and intellectual property
provisions that it contained. 3 The Convention does not acquire
force of law in the United States until the Senate ratifies it how-
47. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 46, at 23.
48. Id.
49. See TOLEDO INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT, Port Honduras
Marine Reserve (PHMR), http://www.tidebelize.org (last visited March 14, 2006)
(follow "Programs" hyperlink; then follow "Protected Areas" hyperlink; then follow
"Port Honduras Marine Reserve" hyperlink).
50. Id.
51. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 23.
52. Daniel T. Jenks, The Convention on Biological Diversity - An Efficient
Framework for the Preservation of Life on Earth?, 15 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 636, 636
(1995); see also CBD, supra note 24.
53. Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the
Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 713 (1995).
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ever, and it has yet to do so.54
The CBD's primary objectives include the conservation of bio-
logical diversity, the sustainable use of that diversity and the fair
and equitable sharing of benefits derived from that use.55 The pro-
visions dealing with access to genetic resources in the possession
of a state, such as those found in reef systems can be found in
Article 15.56 This portion of the Convention recognizes several
principles. 57 These include recognition of sovereign rights over bio-
logical resources in State possession; facilitation of access to
genetic resources for environmentally sound uses subject to prior
informed consent; and the fair and equitable sharing of the results
of research and development arising from commercial or other use
of genetic resources. s
In effect, the Convention calls for a great deal of exchange
between the developed northern countries of the world and the
resource rich southern ones.59 This exchange is designed to allow
access to the world's biological riches for the North, and the eco-
nomic and social enrichment for the South.s0 The CBD achieves
this through the recognition of a sovereign property right in
genetic material found within state borders.6' Genetic material is
defined as "any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin
containing functioning units of heredity."62 By granting this right,
the Convention allows developing nations to realize the benefits of
preserving biodiversity, which previously had been difficult for
them to capture.'
The CBD mandates that in exchange for access to a State's
genetic resources, the source country is to receive active support
for conservation efforts in that nation, compensation for its
resources, and technologies to assist it in expanding its capacity to
exploit those resources.6 These requirements are particularly rel-
54. See Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
http://untreaty.un.orgENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/bible.asp (last visited
Feb. 11, 2006) (follow "Chapter XXVII Environment" hyperlink; then follow "8.
Convention on Biological Diversity" hyperlink).
55. See CBD, supra note 24, art. 1.
56. See id. art. 15.
57. See id.
58. Ling, supra note 16.
59. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 714-15.
60. Id.
61. Jenks, supra note 52, at 637.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 650.
64. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 704-05.
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evant because they directly affect genetic harvesting efforts and
ultimately, the control and ownership of genetic material.65
The Convention uses several strategies to achieve these goals.
For instance, the CBD mandates that a multilateral fund be cre-
ated to support projects for conservation in the South. These
projects would be primarily funded by the North, in theory to
defend their interests in supporting the biodiversity of the
planet.66 The Convention also ties access to genetic resources to
equitable benefit sharing.67 "Article 19 explicitly states the devel-
oping world's expectation that, in exchange for access to its
biodiversity, it will receive a fair and equitable portion of the ben-
efits that the North derives from the use of the South's genetic
resources."68 Furthermore, Article 15 of the Convention includes
language that reinforces the notion of a states complete control
over its resources.6 9 These provisions allow developing countries to
receive benefits from the commercialization of biological
resources, and provide an opportunity for economic development
without resorting to destructive types of exploitation in what are
extraordinarily valuable ecosystems.7 °
The CBD deals with the issue of technology transfer in Article
16. 11 This article establishes an investment requirement in new
technologies in exchange for access to genetic resources in much
the same spirit as Article 15.72 Unfortunately, this has been a sig-
nificant sticking point between the South and the North as they
have attempted to negotiate within the framework of the
Convention. 3
The CBD has broken new ground of a sort with its position on
the ownership of genetic materials,74 and the world continues to
debate the appropriate mechanisms necessary to make it function
as intended.75 Commentators have applied numerous postulations
65. Id. at 714.
66. Jenks, supra note 52, at 637.
67. See CBD, supra note 24, art. 19.
68. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 715; see also CBD, supra note 24, art.
19.
69. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 715; see also CBD, supra note 24, art.
15.
70. See Jenks, supra note 52, at 650.
71. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 714; see also CBD, supra note 24, art.
16.
72. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 714-15; see also CBD, supra note 24,
arts. 15-16.
73. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 716.
74. See Jenks, supra note 52, at 640.
75. Id.
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as to how such a system could work.6 Unfortunately, it seems
apparent that none have yet proven acceptable to the interna-
tional community, as witnessed by the lack of decisive action by
the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (COP), the main administrative body of the Convention.77
While it is still uncertain to exactly what degree property
rights are recognized by the CBD, certain basic rights in property
can be identified." These include the right of nations to control
physical access to the ecosystems in question, and the right to
negotiate on equitable terms for that access.79 Paragraph 1 of the
Convention recognizes the right to "'determine access to genetic
resources' and Article 15, paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 require that
access shall be given 'upon mutually agreed upon terms,' 'based
upon prior informed consent' and with benefits of biodiversity
shared in a 'fair and equitable way.
' ' 80
The CBD has also caused some headaches for the interna-
tional community. One issue that has been discussed at great
length is the fact that the Conventions' wording is too vague and
superficial.8' While international agreements usually include
broad wording, the use of terms such as "endeavor to" do not typi-
cally make good black letter provisions.82 The Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law reports that "[b] ecause international agree-
ments require consensus among many nations, they 'tend to
reflect the lowest common denominator' rather than the majority
standard."" Despite this concern, it is important to note the
strengths of the Convention and its overall equitable goals. Prior
to the adoption of the Convention, enforcement of sovereignty over
natural resources was an internal matter for developing nations,
many of which were ill-equipped to deal with the problem. 4 The
arrival of the CBD "marks a dramatic shift from unfair exploita-
tion (even theft) to a legally binding system of exchange."85
How the world community interprets these rights over the
genetic material as outlined in the CBD, and how countries then
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also COP, supra note 18. Discussion of similar issues that do little
more than resolve to work on the problem can be found within COP Decisions VII/1-7.
78. Jenks, supra note 52, at 642.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting CBD, supra note 24, art. 15).
81. See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 716-17.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Ling, supra note 16.
85. Id.
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interact with one another regarding the issue will have profound
effects on the success of the Convention.86 The CBD states that
access to biodiversity must be granted for biologically friendly
research purposes so long as a country is informed of the research
and gives its informed consent.87 Yet as discussed above, nations
are permitted complete control over their resources through the
CBD and UNCLOS.18 This raises some questions. For instance,
how are countries to deal with one another in regard to benign use
of biological resources? Are there in fact purely benign uses of bio-
logical resources? Under what circumstances may a country deny
access? If an ecosystem crosses national boundaries, who owns the
right to exploit the genetic material of that ecosystem? These
questions have enormous potential impact, because once genetic
material is harvested in one state, it can potentially lose much of
its property value in neighboring states that have yet to exploit
the resource.89 This inconsistency may have immense ramifica-
tions for the MBRP. For instance, must the rights to the genetic
resources of the MBRS and their benefits be completely communal
to all four countries? Furthermore, how should benefits arising
from these resources be divided? These questions seem to set the
debate apart from discussions based on other property rights such
as common oil or gas poolsY° If one collects from such a pool, the
value of the remaining commodity will not have lost its value.
However, in the case of genetic resources, which have a tendency
to be ultimately influenced by intellectual property law, allowing
access to the resource may significantly undermine its future
value to others whom may also possess it within the MBRP.91 This
could potentially create substantial conflict between signatory
nations over control of these common marine resources and could
also undermine the MBRP and affect the functioning of the CBD
itself.92
86. Jenks, supra note 52, at 651.
87. CBD, supra note 24, art. 15.
88. Id.; See also UNCLOS, supra note 23, arts. 3-16, 56, 57, 77-84.
89. Jenks, supra note 52, at 651.
90. See generally McLAUGHLIN, supra note 17 (outlining differences between
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C. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)
An important aspect of the ownership of genetic resources can
also be seen it the interaction of the CBD and the TRIPS agree-
ment. TRIPS has become a dominant force in international intel-
lectual property law.93 As part of GATT, the agreement governs
several different types of subject matter including patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, and trade secrets.94 Several aspects of TRIPS
have received increased scrutiny in recent years for their potential
as both possible solutions and impediments to the goals of the
CBD.95 Of these areas, it is patent provisions that seem to cause
the most controversy.
96
The Uruguay Round of GATT is the most recent effort to for-
malize an international intellectual property law system capable
of addressing the ownership of genetic resources.97 Unfortunately,
disagreement remains high. Developing countries assert that pat-
ents on biotechnology impede benefit sharing and ultimately con-
servation. 8 On the other hand, developed countries assert that
such patent rights promote innovation and economic development
and will have the effect of actually promoting conservation as the
commercial value of genetic resources increases.99
Under current patent rules, a naturally occurring substance
cannot be patented, as it is a discovery, not an invention.10 How-
ever, "where a substance, 'previously unknown in its purified and
isolated form,' is refined so that the product can be distinguished
in kind, and where it also demonstrates 'unexpected properties,'
the refined substance is patentable. "101 Developing countries are
highly critical of a system that gives patent protection only to enti-
ties that are technically and financially capable of isolating and
purifying a substance that already occurs in nature.0 2 As a result,
intellectual property regimes governing control over genetic
93. Kamil Idris, Intellectual Property Plays Key Role in Wealth Creation, Social
Well-Being, KOREA HERALD, May 19, 2004, available at LexisNexis Academic
(discussing the importance of a strong worldwide intellectual property system).
94. See TRIPS, supra note 26.
95. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 710-11.
96. Id.
97. See GATT, supra note 25 (showing that the Uruguay round has produced
much of the TRIPS agreement).
98. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 710.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 711.
101. Id. (internal citations omitted).
102. Id.
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resources have been, and continue to be a major source of
contention.
1 3
Another effect of the CBD on intellectual property concerns
arises in the area of benefit sharing and the ideal of prior
informed consent."4 The need for such consent has given rise to
various contractual arrangements as possible deterrents to outsid-
ers simply collecting genetic samples without permission, based
on the notion that such material is the common heritage of man
and available to all.'05 There seem to be few options available to
deal with unfair agreements that may arise under the system
however.0 6 The impact of the debate on the MBRP could of course
be significant. The notion that genetic material found in the wild
could be taken freely under the common heritage doctrine and
then be subsequently patented could greatly undermine the eco-
nomic value of the reef, and ultimately undermine conservation
initiatives of participating countries.0 7 At present, the debate
rages on as to whether TRIPS should be altered in order to
address such concerns. 108 For instance, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) is now actively involved in the
search for solutions to some of these problems.0 9 The organization
feels that a strong intellectual property system is critical for the
fostering of economic development in less developed nations, and
the WIPO approach is grounded on the theory that nations can
utilize intellectual property protections as a type of economic capi-
tal.10 The source of much of the international disagreement on the
issue does not appear to be the result of such philosophical differ-
ences of opinion, but more so the result of competition for influ-
ence between the CBD and what is considered to be the more
powerful TRIPS agreement, and the fact that such conflicts exist
103. Id. at 712.
104. See CBD, supra note 24, art. 15; see generally TRIPS, supra note 26 (providing
basic structure of intellectual property system).
105. See INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, FIELD TRIP BACKGROUND INFORMATION: NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY
INSTITUTE: CREATING SCIENTIFIC, COMMUNITY AND MARKET VALUE FROM BIODIvERSITY
(April 17, 2002) http://www.inece.org/conf/fieldtripsbiodiversity.html (last visited July
16, 2004) (outlining basic principles of the heritage doctrine as it relates to genetic
resources).
106. See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 717 (finding that the CBD
contains no criteria for fairness and does not address the issue of disparate
bargaining power).
107. Id.
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between international agreements that both purport to be binding
to some degree."' The CBD takes the general view that if a prod-
uct or process has existed in nature or has been known by a cul-
ture, it is owned by the local community or state in which it
occurs. 112 As such, those resources would be protected under intel-
lectual property law."' On the other hand, TRIPS maintains that
if it is not patented it cannot be owned, and thus, it represents
knowledge that belongs to everyone and is free for exploitation by
all."' Again, however, consensus between the North and the South
on these issues has been hard to come by."5
Informed consent will likely continue to play an important
role in the interaction of the CBD and property rights as well. The
Convention states that access to a nation's genetic resources must
be dependent upon obtaining prior informed consent."6 This
requirement has obvious effects on the legitimate ownership of
genetic resources. What informed consent actually means however
is less than clear."7 As a result, this issue has also been debated in
lively fashion, and nations have interpreted the term in a number
of ways." 8 Despite the host of possible types and levels of consent
that a nation may require, any informed consent must take into
account two major factors: 1) what information needs to be pro-
vided, and 2) what procedures should be used to implement the
exchange. 1 9 Meanwhile, as these basic aspects are hammered out,
various nations continue to complain of the implementation of
genetic harvesting within their borders without the fully informed
consent the CBD requires. 2 ° Meanwhile, those involved in gene
harvesting point out the conspicuous absence of any real consen-
sus on what prior informed consent actually entails. 2' Despite
111. See Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property




115. See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 712 (observing that there is
significant disagreement between the North and South over biotechnology patents).
116. CBD, supra note 24, art. 15.
117. Laurel A. Firestone, You Say Yes, I Say No; Defining Community Prior
Informed Consent under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 171, 183 (2003).
118. Id. at 184.
119. Id. at 185.
120. Bodeker, supra note 111, at 792.
121. See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 Cardozo J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 547, 563 (2003).
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these current shortfalls, it seems likely that the development of
some type of concrete international policy dealing with consent
issues would have a significant impact on the ownership and con-
trol of reef genetic resources in the MBRP.
In an effort to harmonize some of these problems, countries
have begun to turn to legal instruments such as bioprospecting
agreements to protect their rights under both the CBD and
TRIPS.122 The practice of searching ecosystems for harvestable
genetic resources is known as biodiversity prospecting, or simply
bioprospecting.'23 These activities include "the search for bioactive
compounds contained in natural sources such as plants, fungi,
insects, microbes, and marine organisms." 24 Such compounds are
a natural starting point for chemical and drug discovery, and are
inherently valuable as a result. '25 This causes bioprospecting to be
attractive to many, and the process of developing genetic
resources into marketable goods and the resultant monetary
rewards appears to provide an incentive necessary to keep the
practice a robust one.'2 6 Prior to the implementation of the CBD,
such prospecting was simply something that occurred. When
research materials were needed, a company went out and found
them.'27 This approach allowed companies from the North to
exploit, in what is often seen as a non-equitable fashion, the natu-
ral resources of many developing countries in the South.'28 With
the entry into force of the CBD, this issue has received increasing
scrutiny, and has developed into a focal point of sorts for friction
between the two bodies of law. The benefits of bioprospecting are
attractive to both sides of the debate however, primarily due to the
economic rewards that both the producers and consumers of bio-
logical resources could potentially reap.'29 Development assistance
agencies support bioprospecting as "a chance to promote ... these
goals at the same time, designing integrated conservation and
development projects based on sustainable use of wild genetic
122. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 704.
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resources by high-technology industry."13 ° However, in order to
realize these conservation goals of the CBD, bioprospecting will
require the cooperation of producers and consumers in both the
public and private sectors.
3 1
When it comes to implementing the practice of bioprospecting
in the developing world, most countries initially utilized a system
of permits that allowed access by scientists or other interested
parties to various ecosystems in order to collect samples.132 This
could often be done at the local level with little or no notification to
the national government. 33 As a result, it has proven quite diffi-
cult for nations to monitor what is actually going on and what
their genetic wealth is being used for." This has led over time to
the development of bioprospecting agreements or contracts as a
method for control and compliance in the developing world.
35
Bioprospecting agreements have been found to be effective
instruments in the developed world as well. A U.S. Federal Court
found such an agreement to be binding when it upheld a 1997
bioprospecting agreement between Diversa Corporation and Yel-
lowstone National Park.136 The agreement provided that Diversa
would contribute specified economic and scientific benefits result-
ing from research activities within the Park in exchange for
biodiversity access to environmental samples collected within
Yellowstone. 
1 7
Situations in which bioprospecting could occur cover a wide
range of circumstances and as a result, most projects vary in some
way. '3 Consequently it is difficult to create a perfect template doc-
ument that embodies all things to all parties. Much like the
projects themselves, the agreements tend to vary widely, as they
are the results of the needs and bargaining positions of the parties
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. (discussing general concepts of the permit system in use in Cameroon
under section entitled "Bioprospecting Contracts or Agreements").
133. See generally Pusch Commey, The New Scramble for Africa: Biopiracy, NEW
AFRICAN, Dec. 1, 2003, at 12.
134. Id.
135. SUNDERLAND ET AL., supra note 127.
136. Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2000).
137. Bioprospecting Agreement Upheld, APPLIED GENETICS NEWS, May 2000,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mODED/is1020/ai_62404390
(briefly discussing Diversa Corp.'s bioprospecting agreement).
138. SUNDERLAND ET AL., supra note 127 (noting that no two agreements or
contracts are the same under section entitled "Critical Elements of a Biodiversity
Prospecting Agreement or Contract").
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involved. 139 Despite these inherent variations, all bioprospecting
agreements should address several key elements in an effort to
further the goals of the CBD. 4 ° These include ownership and con-
trol of genetic resources, compensation, technology transfer and
the use of resultant knowledge.' Agreements of this kind should
deal with issues of control and ownership of genetic resources both
prior and subsequent to the agreement.'42 Conservation of genetic
resource value should also be addressed.1 3 This requires reasona-
ble negotiations regarding limitations on the types of species col-
lected, locations they can be collected from, and the number of
specimens that may be collected.
144
In order to combat what is often seen as a significant problem
with informed consent, the scope of future use for a country's
genetic resource should always be a term of the agreement.145 This
allows a source country to retain limited control over aspects of its
genetic resources even after they have been removed from the
country for an agreed upon purpose. 46 Finally, agreements should
address requirements for the reporting of results of biological
screening for active compounds. This allows countries to enforce
their rights under a contract and dissuades unfair play.
4
1
Additionally, all bioprospecting agreements should have bind-
ing provisions regarding licensing and royalties. 48 All products
developed from genetic resources obtained under a bioprospecting
agreement could potentially earn a royalty and therefore, this
aspect should be negotiated and agreed to in advance for obvious
reasons. 149
In keeping with the requirements of technology transfer
under the CBD, bioprospecting agreements should also address
the requirement that the extracting party provide relevant tech-
nological assistance and financing that will assist a source country
in commercializing its genetic resources. 50 Likewise, any scientific
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be freely available to the source country as a product of its genetic
property and should be considered in any bioprospecting con-
tract.'51 Bioprospecting agreements should also provide for any
specific requirements of the parties regarding stated origin or pat-
enting of newly discovered and developed subject matter.
152
While this list of important elements is by no means exhaus-
tive, it is a general framework that bioprospecting agreements
could generally follow. Although many bioprospecting agreements
do not disclose their terms, those that do and that are seen as
equitable tend to follow a loose framework similar to that outlined
above. This can be illustrated by some of the aspects found in
agreements governing various projects funded under the Interna-
tional Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program (ICBG), a conser-
vation and development effort focusing on developing nations and
funded in part by the U.S. government. 5 3 For instance, the agree-
ments of the ICBG-Peru project address all of the salient points
listed above, and provide for equitable benefit sharing through
monetary and technological transfer as well as the retaining of
local ownership through jointly owned patents on newly discov-
ered compounds.' In the event that a commercial product based
on the genetic resources of Peru is developed, it is reported that up
to 75% of any royalties generated will make their way back to the
Peruvian people.'55 Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that all par-
ties and agreements will prove to be as equitable.
III. PERCEIVED PROBLEMS
A. International Agreement Shortcomings
Despite the use of such agreements, there appear to be sev-
eral sticking points that could directly affect bioprospecting and
the ownership of genetic resources in the MBRS. These perceived
problems are encompassed primarily in international agreement
shortcomings, biopiracy, informed consent issues and potential
conflicts between TRIPS and the CBD."61
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See generally McManis, supra note 121, at 565-69 (discussing general
attributes of ICBG projects); see also JOHN E. FOGARTY INTERNATIONAL CENTER,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATwVE BIODIVERSITY GROUPS (2005), http://www.fic.nih.gov/
programs/icbg.html (last visited July 14, 2004) (providing ICBG general information).
154. See McManis, supra note 121, at 573.
155. Id.
156. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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In the case of international agreements such as the CBD,
there appears to be certain structural defects that have proven to
be problematic. One of the most glaring issues is the inconsistency
or total lack of rules regarding liability and enforcement of Con-
vention positions.157 The CBD, like many international agree-
ments, focuses much of its attention on merely identifying
problem areas, and then attempting to set generalized goals, poli-
cies, and obligations for its member States.'58 Each national gov-
ernment that becomes a signatory to such a treaty is "ultimately
responsible for the implementation of the goals of the Conven-
tion."159 It therefore seems plausible that the upholding of Conven-
tion provisions will likely rely primarily on a nation's perception of
its own self-interest, and to a lesser extent pressure exerted by the
international community.'
The CBD is designed as an instrument to govern interactions
between governments. As such it does not address the notion of
individuals bringing causes of action to enforce Convention provi-
sions. 6 ' Article 27 of the CBD does recognize a cause of action for
participating governments in the International Court of Justice
(ICJ),'62 but since only states can bring a cause of action in the
ICJ, this would logically require both state awareness of a viola-
tion, and a willingness to take action to litigate it. It is also worthy
of note that even in the event of a complaint to the court, the pro-
visions violated must actually be enforceable against the offending
government and in many instances they may not be.' While the
international dispute resolution mechanism outlined in Article 27
of the CBD is designed to deal with interstate conflicts, there is
"no explicit enforcement mechanism or cause of action under the
Convention against a government which destroys its own
biodiversity."' Here again, change in behavior may be largely
dependent on national self-interest, due to the fact that the Con-
vention does not provide for punitive actions. 65 The combination
157. Robin L. Scott, Bio-Conservation or Bio-Exploitation: An Analysis of the Active
Ingredients Discovery Agreement between the Brazilian Institution Bioamazonia and





161. Jenks, supra note 52, at 656.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 656-57.
165. Scott, supra note 157, at 996.
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of vague wording within the Convention, local approaches to
defining what conservation of biological resources means and lack
of measures to force compliance, allows for a great amount of vari-
ation in the level of success that can be achieved.166 As a result, the
CBD might simply be ineffective on some fronts, which could
undermine the framework upon which some aspects of the MBRP
have been built.167
B. Biopiracy
Another obstacle in the system is the phenomenon known as
biopiracy. Biopiracy is defined as "the commercial development of
naturally occurring biological materials, such as plant substances
or genetic cell lines, by a technologically advanced country or
organization without fair compensation to the peoples or nations
in whose territory the materials were originally discovered."'68
Even though the CBD has been signed by a great majority of the
world, the absence of laws against misappropriation of biological
and genetic resources has left many in the resource-rich develop-
ing world open to unauthorized exploitation. 9 The offspring of
rich natural resources and limited government control, biopiracy
has evolved into an extremely profitable business in South
America.170 It has been estimated that the nations of the Amazon
region lose thousands of samples of their biological diversity every
year. 71 Meanwhile, the acquisition of bioactive materials that can
potentially give rise to important compounds allows the compa-
nies that develop such compounds to make billions of dollars.'72
Therefore, it is not very surprising that in the Amazon region,
"only narcotics and gun running produce more illegally generated
profit than the smuggling of biological samples." 7 1 Despite the
clandestine trappings of biopiracy, in many cases it is researchers
and corporations that are the perpetrators, although whether
these groups can be considered to be acting criminally is of course
debatable. 74 Regardless of culpability, what often occurs is that
166. Jenks, supra note 52, at 656-57.
167. Id. at 658.
168. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com (last visited March 16, 2006)
(defining "biopiracy").
169. Commey, supra note 133, at 12.
170. Scott, supra note 157, at 978.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 979.
174. Id.
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samples are removed and taken to the developed world, where
potentially valuable compounds or gene sequences can be iso-
lated.175 If such compounds are found, they or the process for
reproducing them can then be patented under the TRIPS agree-
ment.'76 This effectively procures a limited monopoly for the entity
that appropriated the sample, and returns nothing to the source
country from which the sample originated.
177
To showcase the growing global concern over this phenome-
non, the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice saw fit to discuss the issue of illicit trafficking in
protected species of wild fauna and flora and illicit access to
genetic resources in 2002.178 The Commission went on to
encourage all Member States to "promote judicial cooperation and
mutual technical assistance with a view to preventing, combating,
and eradicating illicit trafficking in protected species of wild flora
and fauna.'1 79 Additionally, discussions regarding patents on
genetic resources, such as medicinal plants, were central to the
talks at the seventh meeting of the COP. 180
Corporations have occasionally appropriated biological
resources that have been known for centuries, and examples of
biopiracy are not hard to find in the literature. For example, the
anti-bacterial and insecticidal properties of the neem tree, a tradi-
tional remedy from India,'8 ' has had over eighty patent applica-
tions submitted by corporations from the United States and
Japan. 8 2 In fact, there are dozens of other products from the
fauna and flora of developing nations that are already patented by
foreign entities. 8 3 Currently, the United States, Japan, England
and France lead the list of countries holding patents on Amazon
forest plant products, according to surveys conducted by Brazilian
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181. Dinyar Godrej, 8 Things You Should Know About Patents on Life: Dinyar
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Sept. 2002, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOJQP/is-2002-
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183. Livia Ferrari, Brazil Loses Patents to Foreigners, GAZETA MERCANTIL (Brazil),
May 17, 2004, at 1.
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periodical entitled The New African. In the December 2003 issue,
the periodical tells the story of the Endod plant.185 The article
reports that the University of Toledo has magnanimously offered
the government of Ethiopia the opportunity to license the rights
necessary to continue research on various reactive properties of
the Endod in exchange for $25,000.186 However, it appears that
local Ethiopian knowledge of this particular medicinal plant dates
back centuries, and the species has been the focus of much scien-
tific research in the area for a number of years.8 7 Apparently, one
Ethiopian scientist by the name of Akilu Lemma has actually been
awarded an honorary doctorate degree by the University of Toledo
for his work in developing the Endod as a possible cure for
bilharzia. 85 The University subsequently applied for a patent on
the plant, which ultimately resulted in Ethiopia being told it must
pay for what it already owned. 189 Needless to say the Ethiopians
were less than pleased. 9 ° These examples illustrate the very real
possibility that the rich biodiversity of the MBRS could be equally
exploited, thereby undermining the efforts of the participating
nations to preserve the value of their genetic resources and ulti-
mately the MBRS itself.'91
C. Informed Consent
Another related problem is inconsistencies in regard to the
prior informed consent that is called for in the CBD. 19  While all
informed consent guidelines include some basic elements, what
informed consent actually means is somewhat vague. 9 ' Closer
analysis of the term shows how much actually has to be addressed
in an effort to comply with the provision.' In her article, You Say
Yes, I Say No; Defining Community Prior Informed Consent under
the Convention on Biological Diversity, Laurel Firestone breaks
the term into its parts and identifies several areas of concern for
each:
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(1) Prior: What activities require consent? What should be
the time frame given for deliberation and negotiations (i.e.,
how far in advance must PIC be sought)?
(2) Informed: What information must be provided? In what
form should information disclosure take place?
(3) Consent: Who can give consent? How can negotiations
maintain trust and legitimacy? In what form should con-
sent be issued, and how detailed should any statement or
agreement be?' 95
While these issues are primarily procedural in nature, there
are other considerations as well. Issues such as how many sam-
ples may be taken for the purpose requested once permission is
attained, and for what purposes the samples may be used come
immediately to mind. These factors are also either not well
defined or ignored completely in the text of the CBD, and as a
result there is great variation in the way they are handled by the
nations of the world.
196
The specified purpose aspect of informed consent sparks
another concern, that of unintentional or secondary uses.197 This
raises the question of whether prior informed consent require-
ments should apply when an invention is developed from sub-
stances derived from active compounds that have been previously
accessed with permission, and if so, how far should this protection
extend. "
Despite some efforts to rectify these issues, there will likely
always be obstacles in this area. This is because of the difficulty in
predicting where a project and its related knowledge may lead,'99
and because in some instances, information can be innocently uti-
lized against the wishes of a source country. 00 Problems can also
result from what are usually very disparate relationships between
source countries and those that wish to exploit their resources in
terms of power and wealth.2' This can effectively tie the hands of
a source country when it comes to granting informed consent,
leading to questions as to whether consent can actually ever be
truly given under such circumstances. 102
195. Id. at 185.
196. Id.
197. McManis, supra note 121, at 563.
198. Id.
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Additionally, there is a potential public relations issue that
can arise from the informed consent requirement. Rounding ethi-
cal corners through presumed consent that is based on questiona-
ble criteria can damage a project by inciting the local population,
not to mention attracting the attention of watchdog organizations
around the world.20 The resultant negative publicity could create
increased costs, failed investments, and future obstructions to fur-
ther research.2 4
Finally, consideration should again be given to problems with
enforcement of informed consent provisions, whatever their ulti-
mate form.0 5 How exactly does one enforce consent provisions?
Can offshore corporations ever really be trusted? How does a
party know if it has been undermined? What should be the result
if a nation or corporation is found to be in noncompliance?
As outlined above, bioprospecting agreements have been
hailed as a possible solution to some of these issues. 6 Unfortu
nately, they also seem to contribute their share of concerns. All
bioprospecting agreements by their nature are different. 20 7 All
have strengths and weaknesses, and some are better than others
in the way they deal with issues between the parties. 20 8 This lack
of uniformity may in fact be bioprospecting agreements' greatest
asset and their greatest liability as well.20 9
The evolution of such contractual arrangements is generally
seen as a positive thing.210 Their very existence acknowledges the
right to ownership and control of genetic resources inherent in the
CBD.21  Bioprospecting agreements also have the potential to pro-
vide economic enrichment for the source country in the form of
shared benefits and technology, which is usually in short sup-
ply.212 Just as important, the developed countries of the North
benefit through the commercialization of new products and com-
203. See Jamaica Potts, At Least Give the Natives Glass Beads: An Examination of
the Bargain Made Between Iceland and Decode Genetics with Implications for Global
Bioprospecting, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 93-97 (2002) (discussing the impact of ethical
issues on bioprospecting projects).
204. Id. at 96.
205. Scott, supra note 157, at 995 (illustrating the lack of enforcement provisions in
the Convention on Biological Diversity).
206. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 704.
207. SUNDERLAND ET AL., supra note 127.
208. Id.
209. See Craig Allen Nard, Correspondence, In Defense of Geographic Disparity, 88
MINN. L. REV. 222, 236 (2003).
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pounds that would not otherwise have been available.21
However, despite their obvious potential, it is not always wine
and roses when it comes to bioprospecting agreements. To begin,
many bioprospecting agreements can be quite complex.214 As a
result of this complexity, and the relative scarcity of black letter
international law on the subject, their terms may fall afoul of vari-
ous administrative agencies or international agreements that
have a finger in the genetic resource pie.215 For instance, terms of
a particular bioprospecting agreement may define or stipulate
actions that are governed by separate international agreements,
both in and out of the CBD framework, which can cause confusion
in both the source and destination countries.216
Also troubling is the issue of unequal bargaining power
between parties and the lack of a universally accepted mechanism
that governs ownership of genetic property rights or the distribu-
tion of royalties. 27 The notion that a poor developing country will
be able to bargain with sophisticated entities with huge financial
and legal resources does not find much purchase in most of the
commentary.2 8 Furthermore, the terms of nearly all of these
agreements are not easily accessible, leading to speculation
regarding the potential for inequitable agreements. 219 For
instance, the terms concerning royalty payments for access to
genetic resources generally remain undisclosed, as they are con-
sidered confidential business information. 22° This can obviously
lead to difficulty in monitoring the fairness of these deals, and
could lead to mistrust on both sides of the debate due to lack of
accountability.22'
D. Conflicts between CBD and TRIPS
Finally, nowhere is friction from the CBD's new approach to
genetic property rights more keenly expressed than in perceived
conflicts between the CBD and TRIPS.222 TRIPS is the result of a
concerted effort by the members of GATT, as they sought to pro-
213. Id.
214. See McManis, supra note 121, at 573.
215. Id. at 559.
216. Id.
217. Nard, supra note 209, at 236.
218. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 53, at 724.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 725.
221. Id. at 726.
222. McManis, supra note 121, at 547-48.
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mote economic growth through the strengthening of international
intellectual property protection.22' As discussed above, the CBD,
upon its formation in 1992, called for international conservation,
sustainable use, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
from biodiversity.
24
The debates surrounding TRIPS and the CBD primarily
revolve around a central set of contentious issues between the
North and the South involving certain economic policies.
225 Most of
the countries of the North feel that intellectual property rights
over genetic materials are a stimulus to economic activity and
that the South mistakenly views them as an impediment to the
transfer of capital and technology rather than as a prerequisite.226
The countries of the South, however, feel that patent protection
should not include any elements of living organisms. 27 The South
is likewise concerned about the possibility of increased biopiracy
due to the structure of the TRIPS system.228 Meanwhile, the
United States has maintained that there really is no conflict
between TRIPS and the CBD. 221 The head of the U.S. delegation to
the Convention is reported to have stated that "the relationship is
complementary and not contrary. TRIPS establishes appropriate
levels of protection for [intellectual property rights], including pat-
ents that can be supportive of the CBD."2 30 This U.S. ideal has
been disputed by critics such as the Third World Network (TWN),
an independent watchdog organization that bills itself as "a non-
profit international network of organizations and individuals
involved in issues relating to development, the Third World, and
North-South issues."231 A representative of TWN recently cited
numerous examples of the negative impacts of intellectual prop-
erty rights over life forms in developing countries. These included
the "grant of patents on genetic resources from developing coun-
tries, often without the knowledge and consent of the owners of
223. Id. at 548.
224. CBD, supra note 24, art 1.
225. McManis, supra note 121, at 548.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 548-49.
228. Id. at 549.
229. Gurdial Singh Nijar, CBD Input to TRIPS Review of Life-Form Patents,
SOUTH-NORTH DEV. MONITOR, July 1999, http://www.twnsIde.org.sg/title/input-cn.
htm (discussing conflicts between the CBD and TRIPS).
230. Id.
231. See generally THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnsIde.org.sg/twnintro.
htm (last visited March 16, 2006) (providing a clearinghouse of information that
addresses a host of third world concerns such as trade issues and other North-South
conflicts).
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the resources; broad-scope patents that limit access to a wide seg-
ment of germ plasm; and protection rights claimed by plant breed-
ers over materials deposited in international gene banks."232
Examples such as patents being granted on food and medicine
plants developed from plant varieties originally bred by indige-
nous people are often mentioned by the countries of the developing
world, and the difference of opinion seems far from settled.233
While the TRIPS agreement itself does not directly address
genetic resources, there does appear to be some support for the
U.S. position.235 Commentators have noted that certain provisions
of TRIPS can be read in such a way as to promote the concept of
genetic ownership and transfer of technology. 36 For instance, Arti-
cle 7 stipulates that "[t]he protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."2 7
The determination that an intellectual property right in unmodi-
fied genetic resources exists as called for by the CBD can seem-
ingly be made to fit within this provision.238 Unfortunately, both
sides seem deadlocked on how to proceed.239
Despite these seemingly wide divisions, areas of cooperation
between the agreements may have begun to take shape.240 These
areas have led some to postulate that the agreements are (or
should be) interdependent. 241 The reasoning behind this notion is
based on the fact that bioprospecting and research on genetic
resources has a high rate of failure.242 As a result, research inter-
ests depend on continuous access to sources of testable materi-
als.243 On the other hand, many developing countries may not have
232. Nijar, supra note 229.
233. Commey, supra note 133 (illustrating several examples of biopiracy).
234. Weerawit Weeraworawit, Formulating An International Legal Protection For
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Challenges for the
Intellectual Property System, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & Comp L. 769, 776 (2003).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (quoting TRIPS, supra note 26, art 7).
238. Id.
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the incentive to utilize their biodiversity in a sustainable way,
which threatens the supply of such materials.2" The effects of this
dependant relationship may ultimately slow the loss of biodivers-
ity in the South as the need for new sources of materials becomes
greater and more incentives and assistance, including the fruits of
previous genetic research, are provided by the North for sus-
taining them.245 In any event, it was hoped that the COP, which
convenes every two years, would be able to adequately address
some of these issues. Unfortunately, most of their attempts have
revolved around resolutions to look into the matter, but little
else.246
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. Concrete International Standards
In order for the MBRP to function adequately, the issue of
property rights in genetic material will have to be resolved on an
international level.247 Once consensus on this issue is reached, rea-
sonable compensation will likely have to be provided to the South
in order to access their genetic wealth.248 The amount of compen-
sation necessary is difficult to estimate, but the amount will have
to be high enough to encourage nations to take an active role in
preserving and providing access to their newfound genetic prop-
erty.2 49 Determining this may not be an easy task. For instance,
how much are the genetic resources of an expansive reef systems
really worth? While the numbers will clearly be tied to potential
earnings from the exploitation of such resources, it is nearly
impossible to predict the magnitude of future discoveries.2 °
Regardless, these issues must be addressed if the CBD and other
international conservation efforts such as the MBRP are to func-
tion in a practical manner. 251 Additionally, it seems logical that a
meaningful liability structure will be needed if international
agreements governing genetic resources are to function as they
were originally envisioned. 52 With a strong liability structure, the
244. Id.
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246. See generally COP, supra note 18 (listing the schedule and text of previous
meetings).
247. Weeraworawit, supra note 234, at 780.
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249. Id.
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countries of the MBRP would be better able to decide how to pro-
ceed in optimizing the resources of the MBRS within the frame-
work set up under the CBD. This would be helpful because
participating countries would know exactly where they stood, and
consequently, would be better able to make rational judgements
regarding the shared resources of the MBRS.25' Additionally, writ-
ers have suggested that restitution for infractions on either side of
the issue could be a useful method to impose liability. 54 By requir-
ing restitution, the legal system would force those that misuse ele-
ments of biodiversity to bear the full cost of their actions, and
would act as a significant deterrent to noncompliance.2 5 Regard-
less of which system is ultimately chosen, there remains a glaring
"need for a unified internationally accepted approach that ensures
consistent enforcement."
256
A number of developing countries have called for some type of
legally binding instrument based on benefit sharing. 257 This
instrument could be used to formulate legally binding measures
regarding sovereign rights over genetic resources, prior informed
consent implementation, clarification of scope, limits and require-
ments for patents, and other legally binding user measures. 258
Addressing these concerns would clarify the role of user nations in
the exchange and would also serve as a safeguard over the rights
of source countries.
2 59
Another problem that could potentially be solved through the
use of concrete international standards is that posed by the use of
language such as "mutually agreed terms" found in the provisions
of the CBD ° Setting minimum standards and definitions for
terms to be used in contract negotiations may be helpful in deter-
ring abuse by bioprospecting interests that could attempt to take
advantage of the countries of the MBRP, by playing them off
against each other in an effort to reduce the cost of access.2 In an
253. Id. at 658-59.
254. Id. at 658.
255. Id.
256. Elizabeth Longacre, Note, Advancing Science While Protecting Developing
Countries from Exploitation of Their Resources and Knowledge, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 963, 995 (2003).
257. Ling, supra note 16 (discussing benefits of a legally binding instrument
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effort to avoid such a race to the lowest common denominator,
there appears to be a very real need for countries with shared
resources to collaborate closely in the development of principles
and mechanisms designed to facilitate access to their biodivers-
ity.262 This collaboration could take several forms. One possibility
is for developing countries to seize control of genetic resource mar-
kets through the formation of genetic cartels as a response to fac-
tors such as inadequate bargaining power or depressed resource
values.263 Other possible actions, including voluntary regional
coordination such as that exhibited by the nations of the MBRP,
take the middle ground and have been reported to be the most
likely form of future action.264 In this form, concerted action can
result when countries with viable sources of genetic resources
negotiate an agreement governing bioprospecting rules and regu-
lations, as well as the sharing of benefits and technology trans-
fer.265 This type of arrangement, though dependent on the
provisions of the CBD for their legitimacy, could serve to mitigate
the shortfalls of the CBD and allow organizations like the MBRP
to generate revenue.266
However, there are also drawbacks to these approaches. One
disadvantage to cartels can be found in provisions of the CBD that
require source nations to provide access for environmentally
friendly uses of biodiversity.267 Again, vague wording makes it
unclear how far nations could go in their restriction of access, and
still remain a part of the Convention.268 It seems likely however
that such blurry meanings will be more of a help than a hindrance
when it comes to unilateral Southern action.269 It seems worthy of
note that many of the signatories to the CBD are source nations of
the South, and ultimately it may be their interpretation of the pro-
visions that matter.27 °
B. Biopiracy Solutions
As outlined above, biopiracy could have an important impact
on the value of genetic resources in the developing countries of the
262. Id.
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MBRS.7 1 Potential solutions to suppress such biopiracy are often
based on amending current intellectual property law and patent
requirements.272 At its twenty-sixth session, the WIPO General
Assembly established an Intergovernmental Committee on Intel-
lectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge
and Folklore in late 2000.73 The tasks the committee were to take
up included "the development of 'guide contractual practices' and
model intellectual property clauses for contractual agreements on
providing for access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing,"274 as
well as the development of appropriate international patent rules
that could address such issues as biopiracy and prior informed
consent.7 5
Meanwhile, the CBD has also identified intellectual property
issues as being of great importance to the debate. These include
"the use of intellectual property rights as a mechanism 'to sup-
port, in user countries, prior informed consent requirements in
provider countries;' and... the recording of interests in inventions
that arise from access to or use of genetic resources."2 6 Writers on
the subject have likewise proposed that the origin of genetic
resources and documentation of prior informed consent should be
required indications on patent applications in an effort to thwart
biopiracy.277
Trade secrets have also been posited as a potential way to
protect genetic resources from biopiracy.7 8 Trade secrets are nor-
mally licensed to someone in return for both royalties and assur-
ances of confidentiality. 279 Trade secrets may include "any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, which gives [that person] an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it." 280 The virtual monopoly created by this secrecy is the motiva-
271. Commey, supra note 133.
272. Longacre, supra note 256, at 995.
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tion for this approach.28 ' While trade secrets are attractive in
many ways, the requirements of secrecy and meticulous steward-
ship of this knowledge may prove difficult for a developing nation
and its people, who may be ill prepared to deal with industrial
espionage while consumed with the business of eking out a living
in a remote sector of the world.22 Also, traditional knowledge of
medicinal organisms is usually known to the public in these
remote areas, and would therefore never truly be a secret.283 In
addition, like all other areas of intellectual property law, trade
secret law is inconsistent from place to place at present, and will
likely remain so for some time, TRIPS notwithstanding.'
Insofar as the MBRP nations are concerned, the most promis-
ing direction may be the hope of altering international patent
regimes to reflect the origin of genetic resources that give rise to
new inventions.285 While this seems attractive to many in the
South, the idea has made little headway in an international com-
munity that is divided on the subject.26 A questionnaire sent out
by the Working Group on Biotechnology of WIPO to its members
highlights this finding.287 Out of fifty responding countries, only
five responded positively to the question: "does your legislation
include any special provisions to ensure the recording of contribu-
tions to inventions (such as the source of government funding, the
source of generic resources that originate or are employed in
biotechnological inventions, the grant of prior informed consent to
have access to those resources, etc.)?"288  Thirty-five of the
responding countries also stated that they had no plans to enact
such legislation in the future. 9
C. Informed Consent Protections
Altering patent regimes can likewise play an important role
in the area of informed consent.290 Once again however, interna-
tional players have yet to come to terms with many of these
issues.291 However, a former WTO official by the name of Dr. Nuno
281. Id.
282. Id. at 998.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 999.
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Pires de Carvalho has explored tinkering with the patent regime
as a mechanism to support prior informed consent. 292 Dr. Carvalho
has concluded that, "although requiring disclosure of origin .and
evidence of prior informed consent as a condition for obtaining
patent protection would be inconsistent with current TRIPS stan-
dards, such a requirement could nonetheless be made a condition
for enforcement of patent rights, utilizing well established equita-
ble doctrines of unclean hands and fraudulent procurement."29
This approach has many exciting possibilities. Dr. Carvalho points
out that in most cases, issues of non-compliance with established
informed consent standards would only be discovered when
enforcement of the patent was sought.29 4 This contrasts the
approach outlined above, by forcing most non-compliance efforts
to be focused on enforcement, rather than on the application pro-
cess.295 Due to this focus on enforcement, authorities will be able to
examine non-compliant behavior in light of informed consent
requirements, but would only do so for those patents that have
enough economic potential to warrant litigation and enforce-
ment.296 This could save resources and have the effect of stream-
lining the process.297 Basically, if a party did not follow the
proscribed rules, it might not be able to keep the patents it hap-
pened to obtain. However if the patent had little value, the issue
would be moot until such time as it did become worthwhile to
enforce.29 Doctor Carvalho also notes that an approach of this
nature would also allow enforcement to occur in an infringement
tribunal that could potentially levy remedial damages to the
affected party, further strengthening the desire to comply with the
provisions of international agreements.2
Regardless of which philosophy is followed, the CBD sets out
that prior informed consent should only apply to specific purposes
and activities under which access was granted. 00 As a result, the
provisions of the CBD infer that additional permissions must be
obtained for additional uses of these genetic resources.3 1 Obvious
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often difficult to predict such matters. °0 In order to combat this
problem, it may become necessary to outline specific policies that
utilize a proximate cause type of analysis for secondary and terti-
ary processes that may be derived from previously accessed
genetic resources. 3 One would hope that the creation of any kind
of binding rules would at least promote the needed stability that
this type of international negotiating system usually requires.
India has taken a leading step in the area with the creation of its
Biodiversity Diversity Act.30 4 This act standardizes the process by
identifying several specific uses of genetic resources in which the
using party must obtain prior informed consent. 5
There are of course competing concerns, and because they are
significant, they warrant a cautionary note. There is a significant
school of thought that suggests that enforcement of intellectual
property rights and informed consent requirements will ulti-
mately raise expenses associated with bioprospecting, as develop-
ing nations would likely gain in bargaining power as a result.
30 6
Under such circumstances, policy makers could be forced to weigh
the everyday needs of their people against the claimed property
rights of various parties. 7 While it does appear likely that solving
the problem one way or the other is really what is in the best
interest of mankind, it is important to note that due to the positive
impact that bioprospectors and biopirates have on the food and
medicine supplies of the world, it may be difficult to convince
policymakers to sanction their activities.0
Finally, effective enforcement outside of the patent regime is
also likely warranted. 9 Source nations will have to take steps on
their own to punish non-compliance with informed consent guide-
lines,310 and may even have to go so far as to include criminal sanc-
tions against the offenders. 1'
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D. Effective Use of Bioprospecting Agreements
Once again, bioprospecting agreements may have potential as
a force for stabilization in the area of informed consent require-
ments. 12 In order to avoid problems that could arise in the context
of such agreements, WIPO has produced a document entitled
"Operational Principles for Intellectual Property Clauses of Con-
tractual Agreements Concerning Access to Genetic Resources and
Benefit-Sharing."313 This document provides examples of standard
clauses and contractual provisions that would be useful in defin-
ing such things as scope of contract, intellectual property rights
and obligations of both providers and recipients of genetic
resources, as well as dispute resolution." WIPO has continued to
look into solutions for these types of problems, and has also gone
so far as to discuss possible formats for a centralized database of
contractual items "relating to intellectual property, access to
genetic resources and benefit-sharing." 15
While standardizing contractual terminology and structure
may have many advantages to the countries of the MBRP, it is
important to note that bioprospecting is primarily a scientific
research endeavor, and there is never a guarantee of success. 1 As
a result it may be also be important to allow some flexibility in
rules governing access to genetic resources in order to avoid sup-
pressing the desire to conduct what could be invaluable scientific
research.1
17
Another advantage that could possibly be realized through
the effective use of bioprospecting agreements is that of tether-
ing.31 ' Tethering requires bioprospectors to perform at least part of
the research and development of a country's genetic resources
within that host country.319 For instance, Iceland has required
that deCODE Genetics Corporation keep much of its genetic
database research and development inside the country.32 0 This
forces the company to contribute to the local economy, creates a
demand for a technically proficient workforce, and provides
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employment and business opportunities for workers that already
posses scientific skills.32 1 The MBRP could potentially benefit from
such tethering practices as a way to diversify and stimulate the
economy of the region, which could lead to growth and increased
prosperity for these developing areas.22 Tethering can also con-
tribute to enforcement of genetic rights for the countries of the
MBRP. Keeping research activities within arms reach and having
them performed to some extent by local workers would likely
improve a nation's ability to police the use of its genetic resources
with regard to informed consent and sharing of benefits arising
from that research. 23
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the MBRP has great potential as a force for
both the conservation of marine resources and scientific advance-
ment in the Americas. Unfortunately, the MBRP is also vulnera-
ble to problems inherent in the conflicting regimes governing the
ownership and control of its greatest assets, and this has the
potential to undermine the success of the initiative.
Through the acceptance of genetic ownership on an interna-
tional level, coupled with the effective use of standardized biopros-
pecting agreements and international cooperation in the area of
enforcement, the MBRP could easily become an international
benchmark in the area of genetic conservation, harvesting and
research. Such an arrangement could prove to be extremely bene-
ficial to the developed world, which would gain a stable storehouse
of genetic material, as well as the countries of the MBRP, which
could easily find themselves the stewards of a perpetual source of
revenue and development. With continued efforts on all fronts, it
can only be hoped that both sides of the North-South division will
someday come to realize that their interdependence and the
MBRP goals of genetic conservation and sustainable use can be
realized.
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